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  2I.  Introduction 
During the last decade, an important number of contributions addressed the issue of the 
optimal number of bank lending relationships for non-financial firms in capitalistic market 
economies (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Farinha and Santos, 2002; Elsas et al., 2004; Bris and 
Welch, 2005; Carletti et al., 2007). Regarding firm’s financial structures in bank-oriented 
European countries, bank credit is a vital source of funds for current assets, in complementary 
of trade credit, and investment with internal generated cash flows and market funds for 
biggest or fast growing firms. In this framework, the optimal number of lenders plays a key 
role to comprehensively manage finance planning and firm’s governance within a context of 
markets globalization, intense competition and consolidation of banking industries in many 
European countries (Boot, 2000; Tirole 2006). 
Following the classical theory of financial intermediation (Diamond, 1984), banks emerge as 
the “best” agents for reducing information asymmetries by creating valuable information 
through time and repeated interactions within an enhanced long-term lending relationship 
with firms. In that sense, the “book keeping” function of financial institutions coupled with 
scale economies in monitoring loans give them a predominant advantage over other economic 
agents. Thus, maintaining multiple bank lending relationships would induce first an inefficient 
duplication of information costs for firms, and second would significantly reduce information 
accumulation for lending institutions. In other words, to efficiently reduce information 
asymmetries and credit rationing, it appears that firms should be faithful and develop long-
term exclusive lending relationship with a single bank. 
However, in contradiction with these theoretical predictions, empirical results (Detragiache et 
al., 2000; Ongena and Smith 2001) indicate that maintaining lending relationships with only 
one bank became the exception rather the rule in both bank- and market-oriented financial 
countries. To explain the economic phenomenon of multiple banking, different theoretical 
patterns emerge in the literature referring mainly to firm’s characteristics, strategic 
considerations in touch with repayment defaults or geographical distances between 
contractors, bank market’s concentration or macroeconomic variables, as well as the 
efficiency of legal system or the development of alternative sources of funds (Berger et al., 
2001).  
The extant knowledge on the determinants of the number of bank lenders for non-financial 
firms is rich but suffers from a lack of established empirical results to really form a heavy and 
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is provided in Europe due to the lack of specific data as the Surveys of Small Business 
Finances (1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003) in US, and researchers have to reach with restrictive 
surveys with regional or national obedience in better cases. Consequently, few empirical 
contributions dealing with European data permitting vast comparisons exist, as far as we 
know. 
To tackle this issue, we provide some empirical evidences on the determinants of the number 
of bank lenders for 3182 loans subscribed by firms from 24 European countries. Using 
different datasets to combine loan and firm’s characteristics, but also macroeconomic 
variables and country/industry level data, we explore the number and diversity of funds’ 
providers over a recent period of nine years (1998-2006) in Western but also Eastern 
European countries. Furthermore, cross-sectional regressions differentiated for small, medium 
and large firms permit to contribute to the debate, testing – on an international basis – some 
simple but fundamental hypothesis offered by theoretical models recently developed to 
explain the strategic change toward a multiple banking environment.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section II reviews the literature and presents the 
main hypotheses. Section III describes data and methodology to test the predictions. Results 
are discussed in Section IV, and we conclude in Section V. 
II.   Literature review 
Banks are fundamental financial institutions in modern economies, assuming management 
and creation of money, but also intertemporal risks of assets’ transformation. Because there is 
little uncertainty on the value of deposits, banks permit assets’ transformation through 
simultaneous financing of risky and illiquid investment projects proposed by firms (Diamond, 
1984; Rajan 1992). Allowing for remuneration of savings for a part, jobs and economic 
growth for another, this intermediate financing is mainly provided through proprietary 
information and multiple interactions, i.e. a relationship lending, or arm’s-length transactions 
(Boot and Thakor 2000). In the first case, the loan officer gathers information beyond readily 
available public information that has to remain confidential. Over time and interactions, he 
develops “soft information” about small firms notably, that serves more efficiently in a 
decentralized financial institution where his power decision about fund’s allocation is large. In 
the second case, centralized banks, with complex hierarchical divisions and clearer 
separations between expertise and authority, will rely more on tangible and verifiable 
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predominant inversely (Stein, 2002).  
Whatever the configuration, the number of bank lenders is relevant with respect to the process 
of generating valuable information and allocating capital to firms with positive NPV 
investment project. In that framework, the pervasive act of switching
2 from single to multiple 
banking is highly relevant, inducing information and risks sharing, asymmetric financing and 
consequently strategic behaviors between lenders. Literature dealing with creditor 
concentration leads to considerations in touch with varied determinants to explain the optimal 
number of bank lenders. Firm’s characteristics (size, quality, opaqueness and liquidity), 
bankruptcy considerations, hold-up problem but also environmental and legal perspectives 
will be briefly discussed below to address testable hypothesis for our empirical work. 
Firm’s characteristics are certainly the most obvious reasons for explaining creditors’ 
concentration. Intuitively, large firms face more complex and diversified financing needs than 
small and medium ones. Regarding fixed costs of maintaining lending relationships 
(Machauer and Weber, 2000), in touch with information gathering and coordination inside the 
firm but also between lenders, it appears that small firms should have a reduced number of 
bank lenders to minimize transaction costs (Detragiache et al., 2000),. In a competitive 
environment, Campbell (1979) point out that bilateral financing can be viewed as an attempt 
for innovative firms to conceal private information on their technologies. Yosha (1995) 
develops a model under the hypothesis that multiple lenders regime, permitting information 
leakage to competitors, is chosen by low-quality firms to prevent from aggressive price 
reactions on their part. Alternatively, high-quality firms will prefer bilateral financing to 
preserve confidence about their comparative advantages and to avoid disclosure of 
information. For the same reason, Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) explain the fact that high 
growing firms and those developing R&D activities prefer venture capital financing or 
exclusive credit relationship. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998) incorporate the tradeoff 
between firm quality and the necessity of competition among creditors to mitigate the hold up 
problem and to reduce interest rates.  
                                                      
2 Among others, Farinha and Santos (2002) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2007) empirically analyze the decision 
to switch bank relationship for Portuguese and Bolivian firms, respectively.               
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is attempted to significantly reduce their number. In fact, banks will be reluctant to engage in 
parcellization of lending with opaque firms because it reduces their ability to exert strict 
discipline and increases their costs. Berger et al. (2001) define that prediction under the 
“single-bank firm-opacity” hypothesis. Dealing with firm’s liquidity position, the number of 
lenders can also appears as a protection since a cut-off in financing investment project for 
single-bank firms can lead to high losses and insolvency (Detragiache et al., 2000). With no 
other creditors ex-ante, the decision to not provide additional funds by the unique bank will be 
interpreted as a bad signal for potential new lenders. Coming from the financial institution, 
that “illiquidity risk” for weak firms especially can be avoided by establishing multiple 
lending relationships. This increases the chance that at least one informed lender will accept 
to refinance the project in the future and hence reduce the probability of early liquidation.  
To summarize, firm’s characteristics theories predict that the number of borrowing 
relationships will be decreasing for small, high-quality, informationally opaque and 
constrained firms, all others things being equal. 
A second core of theories about creditor concentration focus on the renegotiation problems 
arising in the case of default – with or without asymmetric borrowing by lenders – to explain 
the number of lending relationships used by firms.  
Within an optimal contracting framework, where firm’s default could be driven by either 
strategic considerations in touch with manager’s incentives to reroute money, or by classical 
liquidity constraints not permitting to face debt repayment, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) 
built models where specific financial structures can discourage strategic default and deter 
perverse ex-ante incentives from firm’s managers. Derived predictions imply that poor credit 
quality firms should minimize the number of creditors in order to maximize the liquidation 
value and to facilitate renegotiation in case of default. Conversely, firms with low probability 
of default would prefer multiple banking in order to give interests to lenders in asset’s 
valuation and to prevent from strategic default.  
Choosing multiple banks with sensible asymmetries in borrowing between each lender (each 
one being from a different country from the borrower for instance) is justified theoretically by 
Bannier (2005) as a way for firms to assure a minimum of interactions and confidence with 
the lead bank and, consequently to benefit indirectly from advantages related to a relationship. 
Bannier (2006) also demonstrates how asymmetric borrowing can be interpreted as a signal of 
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preserve firm’s ability to refinance investment project in the future. In the same context, 
Guiso and Minetti (2004) reveal how an informed lender could strategically act to extract 
financial rents during the renegotiation process. That is notably possible when information in 
possession of the lender, due to both asymmetric information and borrowing, permits to 
advantageously manage firm’s valuable  assets.  
Due to coordination failure, asymmetric information and strategic behaviors, multiple lenders 
could also face high collection costs when default is pronounced and the sale of assets is 
effective. In that particular framework explored by Bris and Welch (2005), choosing the 
multiple lenders regime could be a way for poor credit quality firms to ensure themselves, ex 
ante, a minimum of renegotiation power in case of default. Inversely, a reduced number of 
fund providers would be interpreted as a signal for identification of high quality firms with 
confidence in the success of their investment project.  
To sum up, theoretical predictions relative to the behavior of firms and banks during the 
possible reorganization process in case of distress are mixed, and credit quality indicators tend 
to be predominant for empirical analysis. 
A next issue relative to multiple banking theories is the hold-up problem (Sharpe, 1990; 
Rajan, 1992). Firms with unique relationship banking are subject to the threat of being 
informationally captured or “locked in” by the single lender, due to the proprietary 
information created through multiple interactions and book-keeping activities in time. In that 
sense, extracting rents under the form of higher interest rates by financial institutions in 
situation of information monopoly could lead firms to deter from investing in positive NPV 
projects and be consequently suboptimal. Switching from single to multiple bank lending 
relationships can restore in those circumstances a minimum of competition among lenders and 
limit for firms inter-temporal transfers of value in aid of the bank (von Thadden, 1995), but it 
also worsens the availability of credit, exacerbates adverse selection and the “winner’s curse” 
problem.  
In a recent contribution, Ionnidou and Ongena (2007) highlight that turning to a new financial 
provider initially involves better loan conditions (lower rates, higher maturity and amounts) 
but, quickly, conditions tight up again to become, in the medium term (about four years), 
around equal to those involving the switch. Bank reputation (Sharpe, 1990) and the possibility 
for firms to use ex-ante pre-specified terms for future loans (Von Thadden, 1995) are also 
  7viewed as factors likely to limit ex-post rent extraction for firms in relationship with one 
bank. Finally, we can note that, in some cases, the informational hold-up exerted by banks can 
present advantages in terms of availability of funds for firms, in reference to the “soft-budget 
constraint” (Kornaï, 1980). 
The influence of the hold up problem on firm’s choice concerning the number of bank lenders 
is clearly driven by the level of competition among banks (Boot and Thakor, 1994). Banks in 
highly competitive loan markets don’t have the luxury to take temporary losses hoping to 
charge relatively high rates in the future. In other words, level of competition of the firm’s 
bank local market limits fund provider’s ability to increase loan rates and profits. Firms in 
developed and competing bank markets are consequently less exposed to the lock in 
phenomenon even if one bank has an informational advantage over others lenders.  
Carling and Lundberg (2002) present predictions related to geographical distances between 
co-contractors. Under the “church tower principle”, they argue that difficulties for a lending 
bank to assess the firm quality ex-ante, and to monitor loans ex-post, increases with the 
physical distances separating them. In that situation, loan conditions will be for a part 
determined by geographical distances and firms would be exposed to credit rationing exerted 
to mitigate asymmetric information created by lender-borrower distances. From the lender’s 
point of view, the legal tradition in contract law and dispute settlements within the firm’s 
financial system is a determinant parameter to decide, first, to invest in risky projects, and 
second, to consider the possibility of competition with others lenders. Legal rules protecting 
investors and the quality of their enforcement differ greatly and systematically among 
countries (La Porta et al., 1997), explaining the development of market and bank external 
financing for firms (Djankov et al., 2007). For example, we know that the English law is a 
common one, made by judges and incorporated into legislature, which is different from the 
civil law tradition of French, German or Scandinavian countries. The number of bank lenders 
is consequently also function of legal determinants and we can predict that in countries with 
low legal protection, firms should have more external financing sources to allow for risk 
diversification. 
III.  Data 
We combine different databases to gather loans characteristics at the firm level and we merge 
these data with firm information and external characteristics for a sample of 3182 loans to 
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3. Loans sample is obtained 
from the Dealscan database, provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Firm 
characteristics are extracted from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau Van Dijk 
Editions Electroniques (2007). Governance variables in touch with bank concentration and 
market structure are gathered from Beck et al. (2006) whereas indicators of legal environment 
come from Djankov et al. (2007).  
Firm Variables 
Size is a relevant factor to understand behavior in touch with financial needs and transaction 
costs associated with the existence of one lending relationship with a bank. To proxy firm’s 
opaqueness and asymmetric information for lenders, we use the logarithm of total assets as a 
quantitative measure for size (Firm size) and we also separate firms with binary variables 
according to the European definition for small, medium and large enterprises
4. Furthermore, 
financial leverage is an important determinant of firm’s dependence to bank credit and, 
simultaneously, for exposition to default risk supported by lenders. We compute the 
(Leverage) variable as the ratio of total financial debt to total assets.   
To consider how likely the borrower’s ability to meet long-term obligations as bank credit, we 
use a solvency ratio (Solvability) measuring the size of a firm's after-tax income, excluding 
non-cash depreciation expenses, as compared to the firm's total debt obligations. Acceptable 
ratios vary across industry but a solvency ratio greater than 20% is considered as satisfactory. 
Firm’s liquid position is taken into account through the Liquidity variable. To meet its 
financial obligations and debt repayment in particular, a firm has to compare its relatively 
liquid assets (i.e. quickly and easily convertible into cash) with the debt coming due in the 
near term. A stringent test of a firm’s liquidity is given by the acid-test (or quick) ratio 
including only cash and accounts receivable as liquid assets and not current assets (as in the 
current ratio). 
For profitability (Profitability), an important factor with opposed predictions according to 
theoretical backgrounds, we employ operating profit rather than net income to total assets 
because that measure is not impacted by the debt-to-equity mix and firm’s cost of debt. 
                                                      
3 Sample size is mainly driven by data availability. 
4 Recommendation 2003/361/EC adopted the 6 May 2003 by the Commission and regarding the SME definition 
which replaced Recommendation 96/280/EC as from 1 January 2005. 
  9Interest expense is considered for an entire part with the variable Debt coverage measured as 
a classical interest coverage ratio. We suppose that how easily a firm can pay interest on 
outstanding debt has an impact on the credit risk level and consequently on the number of 
bank creditors. In touch with the level of informational opaqueness and asymmetric 
information, we identify firms quoted on financial markets (Quoted). Quotation is 
synonymous of large and public information on firm’s activities and financial planning over 
time, and can easily mitigate adverse selection and hazard moral. Due to specific information 
constraints imposed by the quotation on a Euronext list, we also discriminate firms according 
to that criterion using the binary variable Euronext (equal to 1 if the firm’s shares are quoted 
on Euronext).  
Firm’s independence vis-à-vis its shareholders plays a role when interest conflicts and agency 
costs due to asymmetric information between managers and shareholders could be mitigate by 
the presence of lenders. In the agency theory framework (Jensen and Meckling 1976), by 
inducing frequent repayment and strict monitoring, bank debt is a potential solution for 
adjusting interests of both stakeholders. We use a measure of firm’s independence provided 
by the Amadeus based on two characteristics, the identity of known shareholders (public, 
private, family or individual) and the concentration of capital. The variable (Independence) 
takes the values 1 (A – strong independence) to 4 (D - low independence). Finally, we 
geographically separate firm’s from east and western Europe (Eastern Europe, equal to 1 if 
the firm is from an Eastern Europe country). It is now a widespread practice for banks to 
diversify their loans portfolio and to benefit from opportunities given by new markets all 
around Europe. Prior evidence (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2003; Claeys and Hainz, 2006) 
show that weak performance of many local banks in transition economies can be attributed to 
low efficiency and non-competitive market conditions combined with a high degree of 
information asymmetry. 
Loan Variables 
Loan size is measured as the log of the loan amount (Loan size). For large loans, a single bank 
may not be able or willing to lend the whole amount. To deter from unacceptable risk of 
failure on the part of one of their borrowers, bankers prefer to syndicate loans but that practice 
tend to reduce long term lending relationships in favor of transactional ones. We consider that 
information using the dummy variable Syndicated taking the value of 1 if the loan is 
syndicated or 0 otherwise. We also measure loan maturity in months (Duration). A dummy 
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guarantor who guarantees to pay for firm’s debt if it should default on a loan obligation is 
included. The presence of a guarantor is a factor reducing risk, which might impact 
significantly the number of bank lenders. In the same vein, solemn agreement taken by the 
borrower under the form of restrictive covenants are a way of protecting providers of debt 
finance and may, for example, limit certain activities or how much further firm’s debt can be 
raised,. The dummy variable Covenants takes the value of 1 if the loan is designed with such 
covenants and 0 otherwise. We are also able to discriminate if the debt issue observed is a 
senior with the dummy variable Seniority. A senior debt takes priority over other debt 
securities sold by the firm. In the event of bankruptcy it must be repaid before other creditors 
receive any payment. 
Loan Level Control Variables 
Typically, different type of repayment can be considered for a defined loan with specific 
purposes. We discriminate between the main forms which are term and revolving loans. 
Under a revolving credit agreement (Revolver), the firm pays a commitment fee and is then 
allowed to use funds under a maximum amount when they are needed. More flexible, the 
revolving practice is usually used for operating purposes and permits to control interest 
expenses in accordance with the loaned amount. In a more classical term loan (Term loan), 
the funds are granted for a specific amount that has a specified repayment schedule and a 
floating interest rate. Terms loans are used by firms to purchase fixed assets and bring more 
information about collaterals for banks. Differentiating revolving and term loan from others 
loans (Other loan), we address the question whether the type of credit agreement directly 
influences the number of lenders. We also control for the effects of debt’s purpose using 
dummy variables indicating if the loan is granted for debt repayment (Debt repayment), for a 
leverage-buy-out operation (Lbo), for a corporate purpose (Corporate), for financing a project 
(Project  finance), for a recapitalization task (Recapitalization) or for a takeover purpose 
(Takeover). Finally, in relation with the price argument and the “lock-in” phenomenon, we 
introduce a dummy variable (Libor) equals to one if the loan benchmark rate is the Libor and 
zero otherwise. 
Governance Variables 
Finance, legal and judicial structures existing within a country are prevalent when firms and 
banks decide to contract at the microeconomic level. An important aspect of the relationship 
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importance of bank institutions relative to financial public and private markets, affects the 
allocation of financial resources (Boot and Thakor 1994). Another interaction to understand 
the ability of banks to reduce asymmetric information in a better way than markets is relative 
to the degree of competition. Strong competition might result in disintermediation, 
undermining bank’s ability to efficiently provide inter-temporal risk smoothing (Allen and 
Gale, 1997). Moreover, legal determinants in relation with bankruptcy procedures, judicial 
efficiency and creditor rights can be strongly related to the process of firm’s financing and 
especially with loan’s contract design, although the strength and the sign of such relationships 
might vary with the level of economic development and other country-specific factors 
(Mauro, 1995, La Porta et al., 1997; Qian and Strahan; 2007). 
On the basis of those arguments, we include governance variables taken from Beck et al. 
(2006) for finance and concentration considerations and from Djankov et al. (2007) for legal 
arguments. We consider a bank concentration ratio indicating the share of the three largest 
banks in proportion of total banking assets for each year (Concentration). We measure the 
development of financial markets with a variable Stock markets defined as the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to gross domestic product. We distinguish the magnitude of public and 
private bonds markets with two variables, Public bonds and Private bonds, calculated as the 
ratio of the market value of domestic public (private) sector debt securities to GDP for each 
year. Finally, we use two legal indicators frequently used by “Law and Finance” empirical 
studies. Variable Rule of law is an index of the law and order tradition in the country, scaling 
from 0 to 10, and variable Creditor rights ranges from 0 to 4 to indicate how lender’s interests 
are – by tradition and law – protected from others stakeholders
5.         
IV.  Results  
We focus on the determinants of the number of bank lenders for firms using bank loans 
during the period 1998-2006. We use robust ordinary least squares to test the effects of 
explanatory variables relative to firm, loan and governance country-level variables. The 
definition and measurement of both – dependant and independent – variables are summarized 
                                                      
5 The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditor’s consent or 
minimum dividends, to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security 
once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor does not retain the 
reorganization; (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. 
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each year between 1998 and 2006. Most of observed loans are for borrowers from France 
(25%), Spain (24%) and Germany (14%) whereas all others European countries count less 
than 10% of observations. The panel is consequently well-diversified between countries 
across the continent permitting to test for geographic hypotheses in touch with the number 
and the origin of bank lenders. The number of observations increases with time until the year 
2005 (21.7%) where a maximum is reach. 
In table 3, we present the composition of the data by lender country. Bank lenders for our 
European firms are from 48 different countries. European banks are predominant, notably 
from France (18.4%), Germany (13.5%), Netherlands (10.5%), United Kingdom (7%), and 
Italy (6.2%). U.S banks represent one lender out of ten, while lenders from Japan represent 
more than 6% of the sample. Once again, we note a high degree of heterogeneity for others 
countries at the exception of African countries which are very poorly represented.      
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in our regressions. Details on 
dependant variables in function of binary variables are given by table 5.In table 4, the average 
number of lenders for all firms is about 9.6, which is relatively high. However, we can note 
that the number is associated with a very important standard deviation (9.9) indicating 
heterogeneity across firms. In their seminal paper, Ongena and Smith (2000) reported an 
average number of bank relationships of 15.2 for Italy, 11.5 for Portugal, 11.3 for France and 
8.1 for Germany. Looking for the composition of our data, the observed number of lenders 
seems consistent with that previous work. We also notice that on average only 1/3 of the 
lenders are from the same country as the borrower, for a given loan, although, on average 
more than ¾ of the lenders are from Western Europe. 
Others interesting patterns for the number of bank lenders are noteworthy in table 5. When we 
distinguish according to firm’s size, large firms tend to borrow from significantly more 
sources with an average number of 14.1 lenders and a median equal to 11. In average, small 
and medium firms maintain half the number exhibited by large ones but the similitude 
between them is not observed in median. Small firms have only 3 bank lenders in median 
whereas twice is reported for medium firms. The median number of lenders is multiplied by 
two for each size class, which is consistent with theoretical predictions relative to financial 
costs of maintaining lending relationships (Machauer and Weber 2000, Detragiache et al. 
2000). Consistent with this view, firm’s quotation has a positive influence on the number of 
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respectively for quoted ones. Eastern Europe firms count roughly half the number of lenders 
for western countries, which was a prior result from Ongena and Smith (2000). 
Logically, when loans are syndicated, the number of lenders is higher. It’s twice in average 
and median in comparison with non-syndicated loans. If the presence of at least one guarantor 
is not a discriminate factor to explain the number of financing sources, loans including 
covenants are granted by an upper number of lenders in average like in median. The situation 
is identical for loans representing firm’s senior debt. In touch with governance variables, 
index of creditor rights as origin of law do not permit to conclude clearly regarding mean and 
median of the number of bank lenders. 
In our series of regression analysis with the Number of lenders as the dependent variable, we 
try to identify possible determinants of this variable and test different theoretical predictions 
discussed in section II. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White (1980) correction for 
heteroscedasticity, we use several specifications to measure the influence of independent 
variables. The estimated equation is:  
Number of lenders = f(Loan characteristics, firm characteristics, governance characteristics) 
(1) 
Different specifications presented in tables 6 to 9 refer respectively to specifications with loan 
characteristics only (I), with loan and firm characteristics (II)
6 and with loan, firm and 
governance characteristics (III)
7. In all equations, we also control for the impact of loan type, 
loan purpose, benchmark rate, year and industry sector including specific dummy variables.  
Results for the full sample over the period 1998-2006 are presented in table 6. To consider 
specifically the effect of firm’s size on the dependant variable, we run the equation separating 
for small (table 7), medium (table 8) and large firms (table 9) according to the last European 
definition for SME (2003). 
For all firms, in regression I in table 6, it appears that loan characteristics are relevant to 
explain the number of financial sources. Except for the variable indicating the presence of at 
                                                      
6 We match borrowers by their country, name and industry sector. This procedure reduces somehow the size of 
the sample. Borrower’s variables are one year lagged to the loan completion year. 
7 The sample size is reduced again due to missing information regarding the governance characteristics. 
  14least one guarantor to secure lenders (Guarantors), all others variables are highly significant 
and signs are not altered by the inclusion of firm and governance characteristics in models II 
and III. However, R² indicators for the quality of models are greater when including those 
characteristics, suggesting a good set of variables and the necessity to consider not only 
microeconomic considerations in touch with loans and firms but also country level variables. 
As expected by descriptive statistics, Loan size has a positive impact on the number of lenders 
in all tested models. The case is similar when the loan is granted by a group of banks under a 
syndicated cooperation, which generally involve a bigger loan. Larger firms with important 
financial needs and specific services maintain more lending relationships as expected by 
theories dealing with transaction costs (D’Auria et al., 1999). That first result is clearly the 
most obvious and observed one concerning the empirical literature on creditor concentration 
in Europe (Ongena and Smith, 2000; Machauer and Weber, 2000; Guiso and Minetti, 2004). 
The variable of loan’s maturity (Duration) reports a negative and significant impact on the 
dependent variable in regressions I and II in table 6. Long maturity is consequently associated 
with more creditor concentration. We can suppose that, in opposite to arm’s-length 
transactions, long-term exclusive relationships with financial institutions are beneficial for 
firms to borrow funds on a long period of time (Boot et al., 1993). They allow banks to 
develop expertise in understanding firm’s financial needs, risks and problems (Petersen and 
Rajan 1994). In that perspective, time and “book-keeping” will give relationship’s banks an 
advantage over potential competitors and consequently reduce their number.               
The variable indicating the presence of covenants in loan contracts (Covenants) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level in all regressions in table 6.  Covenants tend to reduce 
exposition to default risk for lenders and to reduce ex-post free riding problems and agency 
costs. The higher the loan is secured, the higher the number of potential lenders might be, 
given the necessity for banks to manage risks and to mitigate asymmetric information during 
the process of monitoring. In the same sense, we can also justify the positive and significant 
impact of the variable Seniority on the number of lenders in all regressions in table 6. 
Seniority claims can protect lenders giving their actions more credibly and facilitate timely 
intervention (Boot, 2000).    
Considering firm’s characteristics in regressions II and III,without controlling for governance 
variables, the variable of liquidity has a positive and relevant impact on the number of bank 
lenders. Liquidity is a proxy for good risks and could facilitate credit availability (Berger et 
  15al., 2001). In touch with the impact of borrower profitability on the number of lenders, results 
in regressions II and III indicate that most profitable firms tend to borrow from more financial 
sources than others. Consistent with predictions by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), better 
firms prefer to signal their quality to borrowers and to prevent from strategic default 
considerations. If we consider that profitable firms are those presenting low probability of 
default in a near future, the strong and negative impact of Profitability is not reliable with 
predictions by Bris and Welch (2005). However, considering the “hold up” problem, the 
observed fact that profitability is related to less credit concentration goes in the way that 
multiple banking could limit the information monopoly and forestall the deliverance of loans 
at non-competitive terms (Sharpe, 1990). With multiple competitors, banks are less 
encouraged to charge high loan interest rates in the first time (Ionnidou and Ongena, 2007).    
For listed firms, legal obligations of financial communication and market discipline reduce 
asymmetric information and facilitate monitoring for stakeholders as shareholders, 
bondholders but also bank lenders. Moreover, listed firms are generally larger, consistent with 
previous results, but they are in addition more exposed to agency problems with a large and 
dilute shareholding. Consequently, numerous lenders could facilitate transparency by 
controlling with acuity the use of firm’s free cash flows and limiting hazard moral 
considerations. In that way, we also find in regression III including all available information 
that the most independent firms count a reduced number of bank lenders. Consistent with the 
agency theory view, this result stipulates that less independent firms have to borrow from 
multiple creditors to engage large and diversified monitoring. Lastly, Eastern Europe firms 
present a higher and significant level of creditor concentration in regression II in table 6. The 
lowest level of competition and the high degree of asymmetric information about investment 
projects in those countries are potential factors explaining that result. 
In regression III, we finally include governance characteristics. We find that the coefficient 
measuring the development of public bonds markets is negative and significant. Public bonds 
markets are imperfect substitutes to firm’s loans by allowing banks lending money to less 
risky agents. Consequently, financial structure affects the way firms borrow through the 
degree of development of public bonds markets notably. In touch with the legal environment, 
firms from countries where the application of law is stricter tend to reduce significantly the 
number of their creditors because a good law application protects banks against expropriation 
and helps them imposing their rights upon the borrower and others creditors. Differences in 
  16regulation and law application really matters in the sense that good law enforcement has a 
positive effect on the development of relationship lending (La Porta and al. 1997).  
After the discussion of those aggregate results, we are now able to distinguish between firms 
according to size’s effect. Table 7 reports the estimated results for small firms, medium-sized 
firms are analyzed in table 8 whereas coefficients for large firms are presented in table 9. If 
globally, the results are in line with those exposed in table 6, we can note some interesting 
variations between the three populations that are discussed below. 
Looking for small firms in table 7, we can note that a vast majority of loan characteristics are 
significant in regression I. The presence of a guarantor leads to an increase in the number of 
lenders, giving more security and reducing risks in the same vein that Covenants and 
Seniority. In touch with default risk in the long term, the maturity variable (Duration) is 
negative and significant for small firms even when all characteristics are considered together 
in regression III. Consistent with the previous discussion on the maturity effect, we can 
stipulate that the difficulty to forecasts borrower’s ability to repay debt in the long term is 
superior when the firm is small, in line with the “single bank firm-opacity hypothesis” (Berger 
and al., 2001). 
For firm’s characteristics, we can notice in regressions II and III in table 7 that the 
independence factor is significant to a higher level in explaining creditor concentration than 
for the full sample. In addition, the fact that firm is quoted on a Euronext list is no more 
relevant to explain the number of bank lenders. A possible explanation is that, apart for fast 
growing unity, smallest firms suffer from a “finance gap” and access to financial markets is 
not a perspective even in long term. At the opposite, the absolute necessity to preserve 
independence for insiders could explain the first difference with the full sample. In the search 
for an optimal financial structure, managers of small business tend to give much attention to 
independence considerations (Myers 1984). Conversely to the result observed for all firms in 
table 6, the coefficient for Profitability turns negative and still significant when considering 
only small firms. Due to their opaqueness, small firms are more prone to develop relationship 
lending with few banks, considering that asymmetric information are enhanced by the size 
effect. The “locked in” phenomenon is a possible explanation for that negative relation 
observed between profitability of small business and creditor concentration.  
We are also interested in variations of governance characteristics for small firms. The 
coefficient of the Rule of law variable is more significant in regression III in table 7 indicating 
  17that the efficiency of judicial system is particularly predominant for banks lending to small 
firms. The development of public bonds markets is no longer significant, probably because 
there is not enough similarity to lend to small business exposed to asymmetric information 
and to invest in public bonds. All others results are similar to those observed for the full 
sample in table 6. 
For medium-sized firms in table 8, we note few differences with prior results except for firm’s 
characteristics dealing with profitability and the Creditor rights variable. In regressions II and 
III, the effect of the Profitability indicator is not significant for medium firms while the 
Solvability ratio becomes highly significant and reports a positive impact on the number of 
bank lenders. Solvability can be a signal for lenders in competition to obtain a large part of 
the loan without incitation to capture the viable firm (Rajan, 1992). Moreover, the 
independence index is no longer significant for medium firms as for large ones (table 9). 
When turning to governance characteristics, the Public bond’s effect is still irrelevant when 
the Stock Market indicator becomes significant and shows a positive impact on the number of 
bank lenders. It is also interesting to note that the Creditor rights variable turns positive and 
significant, indicating that lenders are more prone to invest jointly when credit investor-
friendly laws exist.       
Finally, we present specific coefficients for large firms in table 9. We can first observe that 
loan characteristics do not differ from previous results for the full sample. The most relevant 
results are relative to firm characteristics where Leverage and Liquidity ratios exhibit positive 
and significant coefficients at the 1% level in regressions II and III. Large and leveraged firms 
borrow from more numerous banks in concordance with transactional considerations. From 
the bank’s point of view, if we consider that leveraged firms are more risky, an association 
with other lenders can be interpreted as an insurance against large potential losses 
(Detragiache et al., 2000). In this respect, the positive and significant coefficient reported by 
the Debt coverage variable in regression II is not surprising. Contrary to small firms, large 
ones tend to have a higher number of bank lenders. Large firms are the most prone to be 
listed, and the Quoted effect is positive and significant on the number of lenders. Due to a 
higher degree of diversification on international markets, large firms from Eastern Europe 
don’t report again a negative impact of their localization on the number of financing sources. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  18In this paper, we provide empirical evidence regarding the determinants of the number of 
bank lenders for 3182 loans subscribed by firms from 24 European countries over the period 
1998-2006. Overall, our results suggest that not only microeconomic factors related to firm or 
loan characteristics but also country level variables such as financial structure and legal 
environment are economically significant drivers of the number of lenders in Europe. 
Therefore, it is important from a policy perspective to take all of these factors into account in 
order to provide valuable and efficient bank funding to European firms.  
As expected, larger firms with important financial needs and specific services maintain more 
lending relationships. Longer maturity is associated with more creditor concentration and 
securitization through the presence of guarantors, covenants and debt seniority, involves a 
higher number of potential lenders, in order to manage risks and to mitigate asymmetric 
information during the process of monitoring.  
Furthermore, consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), better firms prefer to signal their 
quality to lenders in order to prevent from strategic default considerations. Multiple banking 
can also limit the information monopoly and forestall the deliverance of loans at non-
competitive terms (Sharpe 1990). Numerous lenders can also facilitate transparency by 
controlling the use of firm’s free cash flows and limiting hazard moral considerations. In that 
way, we find that more independent firms count a reduced number of bank lenders. Consistent 
with the agency theory view, that result stipulates that less independent firms have to borrow 
from multiple creditors to engage large and diversified monitoring. 
Finally, we find that financial structure affects the way firms borrow through the degree of 
development of public bonds markets notably. Differences in regulation and law application 
really matters in the sense that good law enforcement has a positive effect on the development 
of relationship lending. Firms from countries where the application of law is stricter tend to 
reduce significantly the number of their creditors because a good law application protects 
banks against expropriation and helps them in imposing their rights upon the borrower and 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
Type  Variables  Definition  Source 
Dependent   Number of lenders  Number of bank lenders 
variable     
DEALSCAN 
Firm  Firm size  Log (Total assets) + Small (1/0) + Medium (1/0) + Large (1/0) 
variables  Leverage  Total financial debt / Total assets 
   Solvency  (After tax net profit + depreciation) / (Long term and short term liabilities) 
   Liquidity  (Cash + accounts receivable) / (Current liabilities) 
   Profitability  Operating profit / Total assets 
   Debt capacity  Earnings before interest and taxes / Interest expense 
   Quoted  = 1 if the firm is quoted and 0 otherwise 
  Euronext  = 1 if the firm is quoted on a Euronext list, 0 otherwise 
  
Independence  Indicator characterizing the degree of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders 
(A: strong independence to D) 
   Eastern Europe  = 1 if the firm is from Eastern Europe, 0 otherwise 
AMADEUS 
Loan  Loan size  Log (Loan amount) 
variables  Syndicated  = 1 if the loan is syndicated, 0 otherwise 
   Duration  Loan maturity in months 
   Guarantors  = 1 if one guarantor exists for the loan, 0 otherwise 
   Covenants  = 1 if the loan includes covenants, 0 otherwise 
   Seniority  = 1 if the debt is a senior one, 0 other wise 
Control  Term loan  = 1 if the loan is a term one, 0 otherwise 
variables   Revolver  = 1 if the loan is a revolving one, 0 otherwise 
   Other loan  = 1 if the loan has another form, 0 otherwise 
   Debt repayment  = 1 if the loan is made for a debt repayment purpose, 0 otherwise 
   Lbo  = 1 if the loan is made for a LBO purpose, 0 otherwise 
   Corporate  = 1 if the loan is made for a corporate purpose, 0 otherwise 
   Project finance  = 1 if the loan is made for a project financing purpose, 0 otherwise 
  Recapitalization  = 1 if the loan is made for a recapitalization purpose, 0 otherwise 
   Takeover  = 1 if the loan is made for a takeover purpose, 0 otherwise 














Governance Concentration  Assets of the three largest banks / Total banking assets  Beck et al. (2006) 
variables  Public bonds  Domestic public debt securities / GDP  Beck et al. (2006) 
   Private bonds  Domestic private debt securities / GDP  Beck et al. (2006) 
   Stock markets  Stock market capitalization / GDP  Beck et al. (2006) 
   Rule of law  Index of assessment of the law and order tradition (0: less tradition for law to 10)  Djankov et al. (2007) 
   Creditor rights  Index aggregating creditor rights (0:poor creditor rights to 4)  Djankov et al. (2007) 
 Table 2. Composition of data by country and year 
 
Country  Number of 
loans 
Percent 
Austria   14  0.44 
Belgium   38  1.19 
Bulgaria   16  0.50 
Croatia   20  0.63 
Cyprus   4  0.13 
Czech Republic   16  0.50 
Estonia   6  0.19 
Finland   81  2.55 
France   792  24.89 
Germany   449  14.11 
Greece   47  1.48 
Hungary   5  0.16 
Italy   194  6.10 
Luxembourg   5  0.16 
Netherlands   226  7.10 
Poland   185  5.81 
Portugal   7  0.22 
Romania   46  1.45 
Slovakia   13  0.41 
Slovenia   9  0.28 
Spain   753  23.66 
Sweden   181  5.69 
Switzerland   74  2.33 
Ukraine   1  0.03 
Year  Number of 
loans 
Percent 
1998  122  3.83 
1999  221  6.95 
2000  243  7.64 
2001  273  8.58 
2002  307  9.65 
2003  349  10.97 
2004  411  12.92 
2005  690  21.68 









  24Table 3. Composition of data by lender country 
 
Country  Number of  
lenders  Percent 
Argentina 4  0.04 
Australia 52  0.57 
Austria 230  2.50 
Belgium 241  2.62 
Bulgaria 11  0.12 
Canada 126  1.37 
China 18  0.20 
Croatia 12  0.13 
Cyprus 4  0.04 
Czech Republic  56  0.61 
Denmark 126  1.37 
Egypt 2  0.02 
Estonia 1  0.01 
Finland 237  2.58 
France 1  689  18.37 
Germany 1  246  13.55 
Greece 173  1.88 
Hong Kong  114  1.24 
Hungary 23  0.25 
Iceland 29  0.32 
Ireland 58  0.63 
Israel 2  0.02 
Italy 569  6.19 
Japan 577  6.28 
Jordan 1  0.01 
Korea (South)  4  0.04 
Latvia 4  0.04 
Luxembourg 102  1.11 
Macedonia 2  0.02 
Morocco 1  0.01 
Netherlands 965  10.49 
Nigeria 1  0.01 
Norway 122  1.33 
Poland 151  1.64 
Portugal 42  0.46 
Romania 14  0.15 
Saudi Arabia  2  0.02 
Singapore 17  0.18 
Slovakia 37  0.40 
Slovenia 1  0.01 
South Africa  4  0.04 
Spain 199  2.16 
Sweden 185  2.01 
Switzerland 124  1.35 
Taiwan 18  0.20 
USA 937  10.19 
United Arab Emirates  1  0.01 
United Kingdom  651  7.08 
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Type  Variables  Mean  Std Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Dependent  Number of lenders  9.57  9.88  1.00  61.00 
variable           
Firm  Firm size  12.92  2.57  1.09  19.19 
variables  Small firms  0.35  0.48  0.00  1.00 
  Medium firms  0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00 
  Large firms  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00 
  Leverage  9.05  23.43  0.24  81.14 
  Solvency  32.54  20.74  -55.36  98.00 
  Liquidity  1.37  3.77  0.04  83.69 
  Profitability  5.54  15.59  -82.02  91.21 
  Debt capacity  2.65  1.69  -14.02  42.77 
  Quoted  0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00 
  Euronext  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00 
  Independence  3.14  1.21  1  4 
  Eastern Europe  0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00 
Loan  Loan size  12.37  1.50  6.49  17.26 
variables  Syndication  0.85  0.36  0.00  1.00 
  Duration  69.74  38.15  2.00  720.00 
  Guarantee  0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00 
  Covenants  0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00 
  Seniority  0.94  0.22  0.00  1.00 
Governance  Concentration  0.64  0.16  0.28  1.00 
variables  Public bonds  0.47  0.15  0.12  1.02 
  Private bonds  0.38  0.11  0.02  0.63 
  Stock markets  0.76  0.46  0.01  3.03 
  Rule of law  8.88  0.79  7.80  10.00 
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Table 5. Summary statistics for the number of bank lenders  
in function of binary variables 
 
Type  Binary 
Variables 
Values of 
variables  Mean  Median 
Firm  Small firms  1  7.0 3.0 
variables  Medium firms  1  7.8 6.0 
  Large firms  1  14.1 11.0 
  Quoted 0  /  1  8.0 / 13.8  5.0 / 11.0 
  Euronext 0  /  1  9.2 / 12.7  6.0 / 10.0 
  Eastern Europe  0 / 1  6.1 / 9.9  3.0 / 6.0 
Loan  Syndication 0  /  1  4.6 / 10.5  2.0 / 7.0 
variables  Guarantee 0  /  1  9.6 / 8.8  6.0 / 5.0 
  Covenants 0  /  1  8.7 / 15.2  5.0 / 12.0 
  Seniority 0  /  1  5.3 / 9.8  3.0 / 6.0 
Governance  Creditor rights  0 / 1  9.6 / 9.7  6.0 / 7.0 
variables     2 / 3  10.0 / 10.5  6.0 / 6.0 
  Origin of law  French  9.9 6.0 
     German  9.1 5.0 






















Results for the number of bank lenders – full sample 
OLS regression results for the full sample. The dependent variable is 
Number of lenders. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. Regression I 
includes loan characteristics only; regression II includes loan and firm 
characteristics; regression III includes loan, firm and governance 
characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the borrower level in 
brackets. Dummy variables for loan type (Term loan, Revolving loan, 
Other loan), loan purpose (Debt repayment, Lbo, Corporate purpose, 
Project finance, Recapitalization, Takeover), benchmark rate (Libor), year, 
and industry sector (1-digit SIC codes) are included in the regressions but 
are not reported.  ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Variables  I  II  III 
Firm characteristics     
Firm size  -  0.3061**  0.2530* 
   (0.1286)  (0.1525) 
Leverage -  0.0002  0.0019 
   (0.0021)  (0.0022) 
Solvability -  0.1171  -0.0066 
   (0.0126)  (0.0156) 
Liquidity -  0.3993***  0.0094 
   (0.1530)  (0.2216) 
Profitability -  0.0397***  0.0490*** 
   (0.0149)  (0.0173) 
Debt coverage  -  -0.0008  0.0002 
   (0.0004)  (0.0010) 
Quoted -  0.0142  0.0173 
   (0.6578)  (0.8084) 
Euronext -  1.7429**  2.1061** 
   (0.7112)  (0.9359) 
Independence -  -0.1911  -0.4909** 
   (0.1927)  (0.2254) 
Eastern Europe  -  -2.0311**  - 
     (0.9514)   
Loan characteristics     
Loan size  3.6319***  3.4295***  3.8182*** 
 (0.1165)  (0.1997)  (0.2259) 
Syndicated 3.0282***  3.4056***  3.8086*** 
 (0.4603)  (0.6578)  (0.7409) 
Duration -0.0101**  -0.0148**  -0.0007 
 (0.0044)  (0.0070)  (0.0086) 
Guarantors -0.4734  0.5427  0.5671 
 (0.5244)  (0.7451)  (0.8191) 
Covenants 2.7354***  3.1955***  2.4687*** 
 (0.4213)  (0.5863)  (0.6367) 
Seniority 3.6650***  3.0967***  2.3840** 




Table 6 (continued) 
Governance characteristics      
Concentration -  -  -0.8799 
     (3.2892) 
Public bonds  -  -  -6.6564*** 
     (2.3235) 
Private bonds  -  -  2.7972 
     (3.7979) 
Stock market  -  -  -0.6505 
     (0.7439) 
Rule of law  -  -  -3.4614*** 
     (0.6490) 
Creditor rights  -  -  -0.3350 
         (0.2835) 
Intercept -44.1370***  -44.7599***  -45.5322*** 
 (4.9742)  (3.0857)  (5.3219) 
N 2901  1625  1231 
R² 0.4672  0.4880  0.5052 




















Results for the number of bank lenders – small firms 
OLS regression results for small firms of the sample. The dependent 
variable is Number of lenders. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. 
Regression I includes loan characteristics only; regression II includes loan 
and firm characteristics; regression III includes loan, firm and governance 
characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the borrower level in 
brackets. Dummy variables for loan type (Term loan, Revolving loan, 
Other loan), loan purpose (Debt repayment, Lbo, Corporate purpose, 
Project finance, Recapitalization, Takeover), benchmark rate (Libor), year, 
and industry sector (1-digit SIC codes) are included in the regressions but 
are not reported.  ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Variables  I  II  III 
Firm characteristics     
Firm size  -  -  - 
      
Leverage -  -0.0018  -0.0007 
   (0.0014)  (0.0023) 
Solvability -  -0.0055  0.0071 
   (0.0128)  (0.0200) 
Liquidity -  0.2967**  0.0710 
   (0.1475)  (0.2144) 
Profitability -  -0.0470**  -0.0662* 
   (0.0270)  (0.0326) 
Debt coverage  -  0.0000  -0.0008 
   (0.0003)  (0.0007) 
Quoted -  0.7573  1.3599 
   (1.8959)  (3.6148) 
Euronext -  2.4288  2.9941 
   (3.2815)  (2.2105) 
Independence -  -0.4380**  -1.1433*** 
   (0.1797)  (0.3838) 
Eastern Europe  -  -2.3257**  -2.3941** 
     (1.0385)  (1.0487) 
Loan characteristics     
Loan size  4.2049***  3.4605***  3.8873*** 
 (0.1902)  (0.2532)  (0.3318) 
Syndicated 2.8166***  1.7002**  3.9410** 
 (0.7160)  (0.9903)  (0.014) 
Duration -0.0350***  -0.0293***  -0.0232* 
 (0.0074)  (0.0088)  (0.0122) 
Guarantors 1.5323*  1.4805**  1.9196* 
 (0.7902)  (0.8301)  (0.7132) 
Covenants 2.8736***  3.2665***  2.5744*** 
 (0.7434)  (0.8789)  (0.6854) 
Seniority 2.3396**  1.6711***  0.8314* 




Table 7 (continued) 
Governance characteristics      
Concentration -  -  -9.5438 
     (6.3480) 
Public bonds  -  -  -3.3153 
     (3.9749) 
Private bonds  -  -  -9.0836 
     (10.8104) 
Stock market  -  -  -2.4426 
     (3.3791) 
Rule of law  -  -  -5.2040** 
     (2.5607) 
Creditor rights  -  -  0.8581 
         (0.6192) 
Intercept -44.0793***  -37.9503***  -42.2015*** 
 (2.9105)  (3.5777)  (3.4928) 
N 717  503  289 
R² 0.6606  0.6907  0.7345 






Results for the number of bank lenders – medium firms 
OLS regression results for medium firms of the sample. The dependent 
variable is Number of lenders. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. 
Regression I includes loan characteristics only; regression II includes loan 
and firm characteristics; regression III includes loan, firm and governance 
characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the borrower level in 
brackets. Dummy variables for loan type (Term loan, Revolving loan, 
Other loan), loan purpose (Debt repayment, Lbo, Corporate purpose, 
Project finance, Recapitalization, Takeover), benchmark rate (Libor), year, 
and industry sector (1-digit SIC codes) are included in the regressions but 
are not reported.  ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Variables  I  II  III 
Firm characteristics     
Firm size  -  -  - 
      
Leverage -  -0.0001  -0.1872* 
   (0.0133)  (0.1047) 
Solvability -  0.0689***  0.0424** 
   (0.0217)  (0.0205) 
Liquidity -  0.9433***  1.0920*** 
   (0.3286)  (0.3139) 
Profitability -  -0.0159  0.0176 
   (0.0294)  (0.0307) 
Debt coverage  -  0.0002  -0.0015 
   (0.0070)  (0.0068) 
Quoted -  0.1855  0.9796 
   (0.1890)  (1.2392) 
Euronext -  2.2957*  0.6136 
   (1.2962)  (1.5548) 
Independence -  -0.0971  0.2933 
   (0.4081)  (0.4038) 
Eastern Europe  -  -4.0723**  -3.6769** 
     (1.8888)  (1.7431) 
Loan characteristics     
Loan size  3.4469***  2.6191***  3.1664*** 
 (0.3564)  (0.4174)  (0.4101) 
Syndicated 2.3782***  3.0182**  2.4068** 
 (0.7297)  (1.5762)  (1.1994) 
Duration -0.0250**  -0.0158  -0.0148 
 (0.0100)  (0.0121)  (0.0124) 
Guarantors 0.2492  1.2705  -2.0554* 
 (1.0946)  (1.2214)  (1.2009) 
Covenants -0.5825  0.6984  2.1477** 
 (0.8444)  (0.9902)  (1.0114) 
Seniority 1.8088***  3.3532**  2.7259** 




Table 8 (continued) 
Governance characteristics      
Concentration -  -  -2.8875 
     (4.1448) 
Public bonds  -  -  -2.3236 
     (2.9054) 
Private bonds  -  -  -8.0754 
     (4.9340) 
Stock market  -  -  2.2324** 
     (1.0351) 
Rule of law  -  -  -3.5214*** 
     (0.8286) 
Creditor rights  -  -  0.9221** 
         (0.3835) 
Intercept -34.9522***  -28.3905***  -36.7622*** 
 (5.3520)  (6.2810)  (5.4928) 
N 538  418  362 
R² 0.5196  0.5769  0.6271 






Results for the number of bank lenders – large firms 
OLS regression results for large firms of the sample. The dependent 
variable is Number of lenders. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. 
Regression I includes loan characteristics only; regression II includes loan 
and firm characteristics; regression III includes loan, firm and governance 
characteristics. Robust standard errors clustered at the borrower level in 
brackets. Dummy variables for loan type (Term loan, Revolving loan, 
Other loan), loan purpose (Debt repayment, Lbo, Corporate purpose, 
Project finance, Recapitalization, Takeover), benchmark rate (Libor), year, 
and industry sector (1-digit SIC codes) are included in the regressions but 
are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Variables  I  II  III 
Firm characteristics     
Firm size  -  -  - 
      
Leverage -  0.0493***  0.0444*** 
   (0.0168)  (0.0166) 
Solvability -  0.0272  -0.0099 
   (0.0280)  (0.0330) 
Liquidity -  1.3673***  2.0786*** 
   (0.2985)  (0.7486) 
Profitability -  0.1027***  0.0712** 
   (0.0289)  (0.0315) 
Debt coverage  -  0.01433**  0.0066 
   (0.0069)  (0.0111) 
Quoted -  2.1681**  3.4997*** 
   (0.9708)  (1.1800) 
Euronext -  1.4261  2.6303* 
   (0.9806)  (1.5403) 
Independence -  -0.2431  -0.4166 
   (0.3138)  (0.3310) 
Eastern Europe  -  -0.3185  -0.1917 
     (1.7941)  (0.2748) 
Loan characteristics     
Loan size  4.2164***  3.7543***  4.2631*** 
 (0.3000)  (0.3315)  (0.3585) 
Syndicated 2.7041***  5.3479***  5.5009*** 
 (0.9962)  (1.0643)  (1.1257) 
Duration -0.0044  -0.0122  0.0080 
 (0.0113)  (0.0129)  (0.0152) 
Guarantors 1.0433  2.3126*  2.5331* 
 (1.2955)  (1.3315)  (1.3871) 
Covenants 2.3659***  2.6767***  2.2786** 
 (0.8834)  (0.9279)  (0.9561) 
Seniority 1.7115***  1.6335***  1.2194*** 




Table 9 (continued) 
Governance characteristics      
Concentration -  -  -8.2185 
     (5.8207) 
Public bonds  -  -  -14.4163*** 
     (4.6197) 
Private bonds  -  -  -5.3832 
     (6.1401) 
Stock market  -  -  -1.8496 
     (1.1859) 
Rule of law  -  -  -1.7481 
     (1.0819) 
Creditor rights  -  -  -0.8772 
         (0.5733) 
Intercept -58.7798***  -57.1037***  -21.4372*** 
 (5.7282)  (6.2157)  (6.5239) 
N 795  704  580 
R² 0.4506  0.4738  0.5503 
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